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The Japanese securitization market remains inactive even
though the motivation for and benefits from securitization are similar
to those in the United States and elsewhere.  Although there is little
disagreement about the potential for such a Japanese securitization
market,1 there are both legal and nonlegal factors inhibiting securiti-
zation in Japan.  This Article focuses on the legal obstacles to securi-
tization.
Specifically, there are three major legal obstacles to securitiza-
tion in Japan.  First, compliance with the legal requirements for per-
fecting an asset transfer is quite costly.  Perfection of transferring
loans and receivables requires notarial certification of individual
loans and receivables one by one.2  The only exception available is
under the Law for Regulating Business for Specific Claims (“MITI
Law”).3  The MITI Law permits leasing and credit companies to per-
fect an asset transfer with a so-called special purpose entity in a regis-
tration system4 similar to the United States’ system under the Uni-
form Commercial Code.5
*Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo.  This Article draws in part on Hideki Kanda &
Michael T. Kawachi, Securitization in Japan, EUROMONEY CORP. FIN. SUPP. 64 (Sept. 1992),
and Hideki Kanda & Michael T. Kawachi, Securitization in Japan, 36 JCR FINANCIAL DIGEST,
Nov. 1993 (on file with author).  The Author would like to thank Seiji Miyasaka for his invalu-
able research assistance.
1. See, e.g., HISASHI OGAKI, LECTURES ON STRUCTURED FINANCE (1996); THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF SECURITIZATION (Corporate Finance System Research Institute ed., 1992).
2. MINPO (Civil Code), art. 467 [hereinafter Civil Code].
3. See Law No. 77 of 1992 [hereinafter MITI Law].
4. See id. art. 7.
The [s]pecified [b]usiness [p]erson who obtained a confirmation to a plan of assign-
ment of the [s]pecified [c]laims under the provision of the preceding article
may. . . .make a public notice of that effect.  If the public notice. . . .was made, it shall
be deemed that a notice by the documents having a fixed date provided in the provi-
sion of Article 467 of Civil [Code] was made to the debtors of the said [s]pecified
[c]laims.
Id.
5. See U.C.C. §  9-102 (1995).
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Second, Japanese corporate law makes it expensive to set up a
special purpose entity as a vehicle for asset securitization.  For exam-
ple, a special purpose entity in the corporate form requires minimum
capital of 10 million yen, at least three directors, and an auditor.6
Third, the regulatory structure of securities is complex and in-
flexible, reflecting a long political history in which divided ministries
have had jurisdiction over divided industries.7  For instance, the scope
of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law (“SEL”),8 a counter-
part to the U.S. Securities Act of 19339 and Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,10 is limited.  On the one hand, there are financial products
that are not within the SEL’s definition of security.11  For these prod-
ucts, scattered special statutes and administrative guidance protect
investors,12 and securities companies cannot market such non-security
securities.13  On the other hand, for a product defined as a security,
the SEL does not allow institutions to trade among themselves when
the securities are issued under a private offering exemption.  There-
fore, a market like the one recognized under Rule 144A of the 1933
U.S. Securities Act14 is not permitted in Japan.
In November 1995, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a
drastic reform plan of financial regulation known as Japan’s Big
Bang.15  As part of this program, legal changes are planned that will
affect securitization.16  In fact, the first two of the three legal obstacles
6. See, e.g., SHOHO (Commercial Code), arts. 168-4, 255, 273 [hereinafter Commercial
Code].
7. In 1998, regulatory authority over banking, securities and insurance institutions will be
transferred from the Ministry of Finance [hereinafter MOF] to a newly established agency
called the Financial Supervision Agency [hereinafter FSA].  The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry [hereinafter MITI] has authority over leasing and credit companies.
8. Law No. 25 of 1948 [hereinafter SEL].
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994) [hereinafter Securities Act].
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994) [hereinafter Securities Exchange Act].
11. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
13. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 43.
14. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1997).
15. For the contents of the Big Bang program in English, see About the financial system
reform (last modified June 20, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb1.htm>.  For a
discussion of the recent trends in financial regulation, see Hideki Kanda, Globalization of Fi-
nancial Markets and Financial Regulation in Japan, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR JAPANISCHES RECHT 9
(1997).
16. See The Financial System Research Council, Regarding the Reform of the Japanese
Financial System, Contributing to the Vitalization of the National Economy (last modified June
18, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tosin/e1a602f5.htm>.
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discussed above are expected to be removed in 1998.17
Section II describes existing securitized products in Japan.  Sec-
tion III reviews the Japanese legal framework for securitization and
examines (1) the Securities and Exchange Law (“SEL”), the funda-
mental law governing the area, (2) the MITI Law, and (3) legal
changes that are expected to occur in 1998.  Section IV evaluates the
Japanese situation from a broader perspective including regulatory
characteristics, political elements, market attributes, and recent
trends.  Section V concludes the article.
II.  SECURITIZED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS IN JAPAN
To the extent securitization is defined as the creation of market-
able securities, certain securitized financial products already exist in
Japan.18  The markets for these products remain underdeveloped for
a number of reasons, not least of which is that most of these products
were developed and are controlled under highly regulated environ-
ments, and under administrative rules that they may only be mar-
keted to certain types of investors.19  In addition, under the Civil
Code, each assignment of a non-negotiable instrument may be per-
fected only with notice to the debtor and with official certification by
a notary regarding the assignment of individual rights.20  These Civil
Code requirements effectively make instruments such as consumer
receivables unsuitable for securitization unless special treatment is
obtained under the MITI Law.21
A.  Commercial Paper
The commercial paper market, which includes securitized
short-term corporate debt, was introduced to Japan in November
1987.22  The market’s growth has been rapid since that time,23 yet
17. See infra Part III(C).
18. For example, residential mortgage trusts and bank loan securitization currently exist in
Japan.
19. For example, bank loan securitization has been marketed only to institutional inves-
tors that are well informed on the financial markets by the MOF Release (Tsutatsu).  See MOF
Release, Banking, No. 800 (Apr. 30, 1992), amended by MOF Release, Banking, No. 1770 (July
31, 1997).
20. Civil Code, supra note 2, art. 467 (assignment of obligation right).
21. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
22. Commercial paper has been defined as an unsecured promissory note issued mainly by
non-financial corporations with short terms.  In other words, commercial paper was introduced
in Japan as a special financing tool in the form of a commercial transaction and was strictly
limited to certain types of qualified corporations.  See BANK OF JAPAN INSTITUTE OF
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commercial paper was not a security under the SEL until 1992.24
B.  Mortgage Deeds
A mortgage deed, or teito shoken, is a negotiable instrument is-
sued by the Land Registry Office under the 1931 Mortgage Deeds
Act,25 but is not a security under the SEL.26  Theoretically, either resi-
dential or commercial real estate mortgages can be securitized under
the teito shoken system,27 but only commercial real estate mortgages
have been securitized to date.  Mortgage deed securitization did not
become popular until the early 1980s.28  Under the current scheme, a
mortgage company issues mortgage certificates29 which are neither
negotiable instruments nor securities under the SEL.30  These certifi-
cates are backed by mortgage deeds held by the mortgage company,31
and the certificates then are marketed to the general public.32
The rapid growth of the mortgage deed securitization market in
the 1980s was accompanied by widespread fraud.  For example, some
companies issued certificates without sufficient underlying mortgage
deeds.33  In response, the government enacted the 1987 Mortgage
Deeds Business Act.34  The Act regulates entry into and business
within the field.35  Today there are about ninety mortgage deed com-
panies registered under the 1987 Act, including a number of bank
MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, JAPAN’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 175 (1995).
23. As of December 1997, the amount outstanding is ¥12 trillion (U.S. $96 billion).  See
BANK OF JAPAN, PRINCIPAL FIGURES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Feb. 13, 1998).
24. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1)(viii).
25. See Law No. 15 of 1931.
26. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
27. The Mortgage Deeds Act places no restriction on the purpose of the mortgage.  “Any
person, who is entitled to a hypothec the subject of which is a land, building or superficies, may
apply. . . .”  Mortgage Deeds Act, supra note 25, art. 1.
28. After the early 1980s, deregulation of financial instruments stimulated investors to fa-
vor more profitable investment.  Mortgage deeds offer a better interest rate to investors than
bank deposits.
29. See YUKI FUJIWARA, PRACTICE OF MORTGAGE DEEDS 23, 31, 298 (1992).
30. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
31. See FUJIWARA, supra note 29, at 23, 31, 298.
32. Id.
33. See FUJIWARA, supra note 29, at 36-37.
34. See Law No. 114 of 1987.
35. See id. art. 3.  The Mortgage Deeds Business Act was enacted primarily to introduce
the registration requirement of issuers to the MOF.  The Act also was passed to prohibit self-
custody of the mortgage deeds by sellers who market the certificates backed by the deeds.  See
FUJIWARA, supra note 29, at 38-41.
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and securities firms’ affiliates.36
C.  Residential Mortgage Certificates
A residential mortgage certificate, or jutaku teito shosho, is is-
sued by a residential mortgage company and is backed by residential
mortgages the company holds.37  The certificate is neither a negotia-
ble instrument nor a security under the SEL.38  One possible reason
these instruments have limited appeal is that transferees of residen-
tial mortgage certificates are limited to financial institutions.39  This
scheme was introduced in 1974,40 but has not gained widespread
popularity.41
D.  Residential Mortgage Trusts
A residential mortgage trust, or jutaku loan saiken shintaku, in-
volves the formation of a trust and the transfer of residential mort-
gages held by a financial institution to a trustee bank.42  The trustee
issues certificates representing beneficial interests in the trust.43  Such
a certificate is not a negotiable instrument, and it was not a security
until 1992.44  The beneficial interest in this trust became a security
under the SEL in 1992.45  When this residential mortgage scheme was
introduced in 1973, the settlor of the trust could only be a mortgage
36. See The Current Status of Mortgage Deeds Business, 17 MORTGAGE DEEDS BUSINESS
118 (Dec. 1997).
37. The jutaki teito shosho was introduced to provide new funding measures for housing
loan institutions (jusen).  See MOF Release, Banking, No. 3095 (Sept. 6, 1974).
38. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
39. Examples of these financial institutions include banks, insurance companies and
Shinkin (community financing companies).  See MOF Release, Banking, No. 3095, (Sept. 6,
1974).
40. See id.
41. As of 1993, a residential mortgage trust is classified as a security, but a residential
mortgage certificate is not.  In other words, packages of residential mortgage loans are trans-
ferred as an assignment of obligation right at one time.  Due to these classifications, the resi-
dential mortgage certificate, when compared to the residential mortgage trust, is not regarded
as an appropriate subject of investment.  See Taisuke Ito, Analysis of Japan’s Securitization
from Originators’ Standpoint, 31 SECURITIES ANALYST JOURNAL 11-23 (Sept. 1993).
42. The residential mortgage trust was introduced first to provide a new route of funding
for housing loan companies, and then to provide banks a means of improving capital adequacy
for regulatory purposes.  See MOF Release, Banking, No. 1238  (June 10, 1988); MOF Release,
Banking, No. 800  (Apr. 30, 1992), amended by MOF Release, Banking, No. 1770 at I (July 31,
1997).
43. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 800, (Apr. 30, 1992) at I.
44. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
45. See id. art. 2(2)(i).
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company and only pension funds could be transferees of trust certifi-
cates.46  The scheme was deregulated in 1988 when the Ministry of Fi-
nance (“MOF”) permitted banks to act as settlors and institutional
investors to act as transferees.47
E.  Bank Loans
The securitization of bank loans was introduced for loans to mu-
nicipal bodies in 198948 and for other loans in 1990.49  Bank loans are
securitized by partial assignment, and the transferee in these transac-
tions must be a financial institution.50  An assigned portion is neither
a negotiable instrument nor a security under the SEL.51  In 1997, a
beneficial interest in a trust did become a security under the SEL
where the trust property is any loan from a financial institution.52
F.  Divided Ownership Interest in Commercial Real Property  
Several years ago, real estate companies created a structure by
which ownership interests in certain commercial real property were
divided and sold to investors.53  Such divided interests are typically
sold to wealthy individuals because this structure enjoys favorable tax
treatment in Japan and often functions as a shelter for other taxable
income.54  In 1994, a special statute entitled the Law for Regulating
Common Business of Real Property was passed under the leadership
of the Ministry of Construction.  The idea was to introduce a scheme
like a real estate investment trust in Japan.55  This scheme is not very
popular, however, because the real estate industry insisted that inves-
tors’ interests remain in real estate, thereby preserving the investors’
depreciation deduction for tax purposes.56  As a result of this tax
46. See REIJI YASUI, PRACTICE OF SECURITIZATION OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE 212, 221
(1988).
47. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 1238, (June 10, 1988).
48. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 1821 (July 17, 1989).
49. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 521 (Mar. 12, 1990).
50. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 800, (Apr. 30, 1992), at II, III.
51. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
52. See SEL APPLICATION ORDINANCE art. 1-3.
53. In the early 1980s, some real estate companies (for example, Maruko) promoted this
structure in to develop large projects by means of their creditworthiness, without hearing to
raise substantial funds.  This scheme performed as a tax shelter during the 1980s, as it did in the
United States.
54. A tax benefit is gained from claiming a depreciation deduction for buildings.
55. See Law No. 77 of 1994, art. 1.
56. Income Tax Law, Law No. 33 of 1965, arts. 26, 37(1).
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treatment, there is no negotiability of the securitized product under
the real estate investment trust.
G.  Leases and Autoloans
In recent years, leasing and credit companies created financial
products securitizing lease receivables and autoloans.  Some of these
companies use a trust structure in which a pool of autoloans or lease
receivables is transferred to a trustee and the beneficial interests in
the trust are marketed.57  Others use a special purpose company to
which such pool is sold, and the claim representing the price of the
sale is divided and marketed.58  These products are neither negotiable
instruments nor securities.59  Beginning in June 1993, they were
regulated by the MITI Law unless they were marketed solely to cer-
tain institutional investors.60  In 1996, a corporate form vehicle that
issues debt securities and commercial papers was introduced,61 and
since then the market for securitization of leasing obligations and
other credits has grown extensively.62
H.  Other Asset Securitization
  All of the foregoing securitized products were introduced under
a highly regulated environment.  In recent years, however, holders of
assets that did not fall within this regulatory framework, such as in-
dustrial companies, gradually began to securitize their assets—
typically commercial receivables and loans—by setting up a special
purpose corporation (SPC) that issues debt securities or commercial
papers.63  Sometimes the originators make costly notarial perfection
of asset transfer to the SPC, and sometimes they do not.  Due to rat-
ing concerns, they often set up an SPC outside Japan—typically in
57. See STUDY GROUP ON ASSET SECURITIZATION, FUTURE OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
5-6 (1992) (unpublished research paper on file with author).
58. See id.
59. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
60. See MITI Law, supra note 3, art. 68.
61. See MITI LAW APPLICATION ORDINANCE, art. 1-2 (amended 1996).
62. See Credit Securitization Shows Sharp Growth, NIKKEI ENG. NEWS, Feb. 10, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 4443284.
63. For example, consider Mycal Corporation’s securitization structure for capital equip-
ment.  See Mycal Adopts Unusual Securitization Structure, NIKKEI ENG. NEWS, May 30, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10671296.
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the Cayman Islands—and have the SPC ownership given to a chari-
table trust.64  Such SPC sets up a branch, or subsidiary, in Japan and
the assets are transferred to the branch or the subsidiary.  Securities
issued by the SPC are marketed either in or outside Japan.  If they
are issued and marketed outside Japan, the SEL does not apply.65  If
they are issued and marketed in Japan, however, the SEL applies, but
they usually are marketed to institutions within the private offering
exemption of the SEL.66
III.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.  The Securities and Exchange Law
1.  The Basic Structure.  The fundamental law governing
securities in Japan is the Securities and Exchange Law.67  The SEL
was modeled on the U.S. federal securities laws, specifically the 1933
Securities Act68 and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.69
2.  Amendments Before 1992.  There are several important
differences between the Japanese legal framework for securities and
that of the United States. 70  First, while the notion of a security is
broadly defined in the United States,71 it is quite limited in Japan.
64. For tax purposes and to achieve a bankruptcy-remote structure, the SPC should be
owned by an independent third party such as a “charitable trust”.  If declared as a trust, this
entity technically would have no stockholder.  See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED
FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 21 (2d ed. 1993).
65. No case has applied the SEL extraterritorially.
66. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(3)(ii).
67. See SEL, supra note 8.
68. See Securities Act, supra note 9.
69. See Securities Exchange Act, supra note 10.
70. See SEL, supra note 8.  Until 1992, the SEL art. 2(1) defined a security as one of the
following items:
(i) government debt security;
(ii) municipal debt security;
(iii)debt security issued under a special statute by a corporation;
(iv) secured or unsecured debt security issued by a business corporation;
(v) stock issued by a corporation organized under a special statute;
(vi) stock and warrant issued by a business corporation;
(vii)beneficial certificate under a securities investment trust or loan trust;
(viii)security or certificate issued by a foreign government or foreign corporation that
has the characteristics of the security or certificate listed in (i) - (vii) above; and
(ix) any other security or certificate designated by cabinet order.
71. See U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(1) (1994).
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This is of particular significance to the securitization market in Japan.
Although the MOF was empowered to name new securities un-
der Section 1, Article 2, item 9 of the SEL,72 the last instrument to be
newly designated under this provision was in 1953.73  Thus, in practice
the definition of a security has been limited to the specified items.
The definition of a security was changed with the SEL’s 1992
amendments, which are discussed later in this section.74
A second important difference between U.S. and Japanese secu-
rities laws is that, by employing the notion of a security, the SEL
links its investor protection rules to Article 65 of the SEL (a rule
similar to a provision of the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act),75 which essen-
tially prohibits banks and insurance companies from engaging in the
securities business (with the exception of government and public se-
curities).76  This regulatory structure, known as the “one-set struc-
ture” in Japan, is crucial to understanding developments in the regu-
lation of new financial instruments.  If a financial product is a security
as defined by the SEL, investors enjoy the protection of the SEL, but
banks are prohibited from handling the product.77  On the other hand,
Article 43 of the SEL prohibits securities firms from handling a
product other than a security unless they obtain special permission
from the MOF.78  If a product is not a security, banks may handle it
while securities firms may not; investors therefore receive no protec-
tion under the SEL.79
As new financial products developed, the MOF was forced to
prioritize the issue of whether the banking or the securities industry
would handle each new product at the expense of the investor protec-
tion issue.  This was the result of a long battle between the two indus-
tries.80  For example, the MOF adopted a policy of allowing both
72. See supra note 70.
73. The “beneficial certificate under loan trust” was designated as a security by the SEL
Application Ordinance in 1952, and was defined as a security under SEL Article 2(1)(vii) in
1953.
74. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1994).
76. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 65.
77. See id.
78. See id. art. 43.  See also supra note 7.
79. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 65.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 132-134.
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banks and securities firms to handle commercial paper.  The securi-
ties firms received special permission to handle commercial paper
under Article 43 of the SEL.81  Meanwhile, the banking industry suc-
cessfully persuaded the MOF to exclude securities firms from inter-
mediary services for residential mortgage trusts and securitized bank
loans.82  Thus, the MOF treated these instruments as “non-securities,”
which banks may handle under the SEL.
As a result, investors in non-securities are left without the disclo-
sure and anti-fraud protections of the SEL.  This has been of great
concern to the MOF, especially prior to 1992.  To remedy this situa-
tion, the MOF took two actions.  First, it initiated special legislation
to protect investors with respect to certain instruments, including
teito shoken (mortgage deeds).83  Second, by administrative guidance,
the MOF prohibited banks (and securities firms with respect to
commercial paper) from selling certain products with a unit value of
less than one hundred million yen.84  The purpose of this limitation
was to prevent the sale of such products to the general public, who
were deemed to require the protection offered by the SEL.  Com-
mercial paper and residential mortgage trusts were included in this
limitation.85
This special legislation has imposed enormous costs on the in-
dustry.  For example, hundreds of new statutes must be passed and
no new financial product may be sold until corresponding legislation
is enacted.  The “minimum unit rule” disqualified new financial
products from potential sale to small investors, thereby hindering the
development of secondary markets and raising initial financing costs.
As a result, many non-securities in Japan await further fundamental
reform of the SEL.  The important amendments made to the SEL in
1992 have addressed some of these issues.
81. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 43.  Article 43 prohibits securities companies from engaging
in business other than the securities business.  However, special permission to engage in such
activities may be gained as long as the nature of the business is related to securities, and does
not violate public policy or threaten investor protection.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 132-134.
83. See supra note 34.
84. See MOF Release, Banking, No. 610 (Apr. 1, 1993).
85. See id.; MOF Release, Banking, No. 800 (Apr. 30, 1992).
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3.  1992 Amendments.  Amendments to the SEL and to certain
banking statutes were passed by the Diet in June 1992, and came into
effect in April 1993.86  These new amendments address some of the
concerns raised above.  For example, the definition of “security”
under the SEL was amended to include the following:
(viii)  a promissory note issued by a corporation for funding for its
business, as designated by MOF regulation; . . . (x) a security or cer-
tificate issued by a foreign corporation which represents a benefici-
ary trust interest or similar interest in loans by a bank or any other
lending institution, as designated by MOF regulation.87
Commercial paper was designated as a security under item 8
above, and securitized credit card receivables organized in the United
States (known as CARDS) were designated as securities under item
10 above.88  Of course, these could have been designated as securities
prior to the 1992 amendments, but, as mentioned previously, no such
designations were made under item 9 of the current SEL.89
In addition, the catch-all provision of the current SEL, item 9,
was replaced by the following:  “(xi) any other security or certificate
designated by cabinet order as necessary to ensure the public interest
or investor protection, with consideration given to its transferability
and other conditions.”90
While more narrowly drafted than the old catch-all provision,
this new provision is expected to be relied upon by the MOF to des-
ignate new securities.91  The new provision permits the MOF to have
any other “paperized” (i.e., “certificated”) instrument designated as a
security under item 11, unless the transferability of the instrument is
restricted or, for instance, the instrument is governed by a different
statute concerning investor protection (typically administered by a
different ministry).  Thus far, negotiable certificates of deposits is-
sued outside Japan have been designated as securities.92
86. Law No. 73 of 1992.
87. See id. art. 2.  In 1993, preferred stock issued by a certain cooperative financial institu-
tion was also added to the definition of security.  See id. art. 2(5-2).
88. See MOF Regulations (shorei) for further interpretation of the definition of a security
under Article 2 of the SEL.
89. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
90. See Law No. 73 of 1992.
91. Since the MOF drafted the 1992 amendments in order to enhance investor protection,
its intent to use the new provision is clear.  While it could be argued that this was the case un-
der the old SEL in 1948, the subsequent battle between the banking and securities industries
prevented the designation of new securities under old Article 2(1)(ix).
92. See SEL APPLICATION ORDINANCE art. 1.
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The definition of a “deemed” security was expanded under Arti-
cle 2, Section 2 of the SEL to include not only a right which, in prin-
ciple, is expected to be paperized (though it may not actually be certi-
ficated), but also a right which is not expected to be paperized, if such
right falls within one of three categories.93
A beneficial interest in a residential mortgage trust was desig-
nated as a security by cabinet order in 1993.94  In 1997, this was ex-
panded to include a beneficial interest of a trust in which the trust
property is any loan from any financial institution.95  In addition, the
MOF is empowered to have any right or interest designated as a se-
curity by cabinet order if the right is a monetary claim, the designa-
tion of the right as a security is necessary to ensure the public interest
or investor protection and consideration is given to the transferability
of the right and other conditions.96
Although the definition of a “security” has been expanded by
the 1992 Amendments, these statutory changes have resulted in a
new definition narrower in scope than originally envisioned.  This re-
sult is in part due to the political battles and compromises reached
between the banking and securities industries, as well as those
reached among the ministries, particularly the MOF and the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”).97
In addition, the wall between the banking and securities indus-
tries has been lowered as a result of the new legislation.  For instance,
a bank is now permitted to establish a subsidiary to engage in certain
types of securities businesses.  At the same time, “fire walls” are re-
quired between a parent bank and its securities subsidiary.98
93. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(2).  The three categories are:
(i) Beneficial interests in a trust of loans by a bank, a trust company or a person en-
gaged in a business of lending money on a long-term basis principally for the purposes
of acquiring housing;
(ii) Rights against a foreign juridical person having the same nature as the rights enu-
merated in the preceding Item; and
(iii) In addition to those enumerated in the preceding two Items, those prescribed by
Cabinet Order as those necessary and appropriate for the public welfare or the protec-
tion of investors.
Id.
94. See SEL APPLICATION ORDINANCE arts. 1-3 (as amended, 1993).
95. See SEL APPLICATION ORDINANCE arts. 1-3 (as amended, 1997).
96. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(2)(iii).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 132-134.
98. See, e.g., SEL, supra note 8, art. 42-2.
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B.  Law for Regulating Business of Specified Claims
As briefly noted above, special legislation on asset securitization
of leasing and credit companies was passed in 1992 and went into ef-
fect in June 1993.  The Law for Regulating Business of Specified
Claims (“MITI Law”) was passed under the leadership of MITI.  The
main thrust of this law is to permit an easy way of perfecting an as-
signment of loans and receivables by the leasing and credit compa-
nies to the special purpose entity.  A registration system was intro-
duced: simple registration with the MITI as well as public notice of
the loans or receivables is now sufficient for perfection of the trans-
fer.99
However, scheme regulation was imposed, and leasing and credit
companies now must submit to additional layers of regulatory con-
trol.  For example, such companies must register the planned securi-
tization structure with the MITI and be subject to its supervision.100
There is substantive review of the securitization plan by a special or-
ganization known as the Structured Finance Institute of Japan.101  Ex-
emption from this scheme regulation is available when marketing is
limited to certain large business entities.102
In addition, unless a trust is used, the special purpose vehicle
must be licensed by both the MITI and the MOF.103  Moreover, those
who market the securitized products to investors must be licensed to
do so by both the MITI and the MOF and are subject to rules for in-
vestor protection under the law.  The joint jurisdictions of the MITI
and MOF result from political battles between them in drafting the
statute.104
Finally, the scheme under the MITI Law is unavailable to other
originators of securitizable assets, such as banks and industrial com-
panies.105
99. See MITI Law, supra note 3, art. 7.
100. See id. arts. 3, 12.
101. See id. art. 12.  The Structured Finance Institute of Japan was established to protect
investors and to promote the sound growth of the market for structured finance products by
reviewing structured finance plans, collecting and dispensing information, undertaking studies
and holding seminars.  See STRUCTURED FINANCE INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, SPECIFIED CLAIMS
LAW AND STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS (Mar. 1995).
102. See MITI Law, supra note 3, art. 68.
103. See id. art. 30.
104. See id. art. 72; see also infra text accompanying notes 132-134.
105. See MITI Law, supra note 3, art. 2.
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C.  Expected Legislative Changes in 1998
Unfavorable economic conditions pervasive since the stock mar-
ket and real estate bubbles burst in 1991, coupled with the subse-
quent decrease in the power and competitiveness of the financial and
real property sectors in Japan, drew attention to the expansion of the
securitization market.  While proponents of this expansion often mis-
takenly view securitization as the panacea for bad loan and other post
bubble-bursting problems in the financial and real estate markets, the
proposed legislative changes fortunately include improvements in the
general structure of the relevant laws and regulations.106  Among the
three legal obstacles for securitization identified at the outset—
unpractical method of perfection, costly corporate law and lack of a
secondary market among institutions (together with complex securi-
ties regulation in general)—the first two are expected to be resolved.
First, the Ministry of Justice has prepared a bill for a special
statute which would recognize a special rule for perfecting an assign-
ment of loans, receivables and other claims.107  The new scheme
would permit perfection by registration at a local registry office, and
this method would be available for any assignment of a monetary
claim by any incorporated entity.108  Thus, perfection should prove
less cumbersome.
Second, the MOF has prepared a bill for a special statute that
would reduce the cost of legal compliance when setting up an SPC.109
This special corporation could be set up with minimum capital of
three million yen, and issue debt securities (including commercial pa-
per) and preferred stock.  Dividends to the preferred stock would be
exempted from double taxation under certain conditions.110  These se-
curities would become securities under the SEL definition.111  The
governance structure of the corporation would exist simpler than that
106. See Financial System Research Council, supra note 16.
107. See Bill relating to the Law for Special Treatment of the Perfection of Assignment of
Obligation Rights in the Civil Code, submitted to the Diet, Feb. 6, 1998.
108. See id. art. 2.
109. See Bill Relating to the Law for Securitization of Specific Assets by Specific Purpose
Company, submitted to the Diet, Mar. 10, 1998.
110. See Outline of Bill Relating to the Law for Securitization of Specific Assets by Specific
Purpose Company (Feb. 1998).
111. See id.
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of an ordinary joint stock company: under the proposed law, there
could be one director, but an auditor and an accountant are re-
quired.112  However, the corporation would have to be registered with
the FSA, and be subject to its supervision.  This supervision would be
mainly to ensure that the corporation could not engage in activities
other than securitization.  There would be no merit review, as is the
case under the MITI Law.113  This scheme would be available for the
securitization of any type of monetary claims (including loans and re-
ceivables) as well as real property.114
If all these proposed legal changes are made in 1998, some of the
fundamental legal obstacles identified at the outset will be removed.
Among these three fundamental legal obstacles, only the third (lack
of a secondary market among institutions, such as a Rule 144A mar-
ket115) remains a possible concern.  Other matters, though perhaps
minor, include the validity of a contract clause prohibiting the SPC
from filing an insolvency petition.116  This type of clause is of particu-
lar concern to rating agencies, and is most likely to be invalid under
current Japanese law.117  Also, accounting treatment is still uncertain
in Japan, and except for the scheme that falls within the new SPC
law, tax law is not favorable for a corporate form entity.118  However,
these factors are rather small, and once all the proposed legal
changes are made, the securitization market in Japan is expected to
grow.  The following section describes broader environments that
may be relevant to securitization in Japan and discusses unique char-




115. See Private Resales of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1997).
116. Rating agencies usually require the special purpose entity to insert this clause so as to
be “bankruptcy-remote.”  See Petrina R. Dawson, Rating Games with Contingent Transfer: A
Structured Finance Illusion, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 379, 391 n.73 and accompanying text
(1998).
117. See Tokyo High Court Decree, 33 KAMINSHU 1433 (Nov. 30, 1982).
118. There is no special provision in Japanese income tax law that permits a one-tier tax on
corporations.  Compare with U.S. Internal Revenue Code sections 860A-860G on the real es-
tate mortgage conduit (REMIC), and sections 860H-860L on the financial asset securitization
investment trusts (FASIT).  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860L (1994).
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IV.  EVALUATING CHANGING REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENTS
A.  Regulatory Characteristics119
1.  No Rule Means Prohibition.  In Japan, an important
customary rule exists in the financial services area.  The lack of an
explicit legal rule endorsing a certain activity is interpreted as a
prohibition of such activity.120  If no explicit rule exists as to whether a
new instrument—such as a negotiable certificate that represents the
beneficial interest in a trust (other than a loan trust or a securities
investment trust)—is a security under the SEL, or if the rules are
unclear, financial institutions will not invent and market such
instruments.  In other words, until there is a consensus about a
financial instrument and then a lengthy process to establish an
explicit rule or administrative guideline, virtually no institution will
create or market such instrument.  As Japan’s Big Bang program is
implemented further, however, this custom may disappear.121
2.  Lack of Litigation.  There is almost no litigation involving
new financial instruments in Japan.122  All relevant parties participate
in the administrative rulemaking and legislative processes.  Once the
parties reach an accord, it is unlikely that the agreement will be
challenged in a court.  When a dispute is resolved by introducing new
legislation, it may be difficult and costly to attack such legislation
judicially.  Likewise, judicial challenges against administrative
rulemaking are rare in Japan.123  Again, however, as the Big Bang
program proceeds these legal traditions may change.124
3.  Formalism.  The MOF’s rules and guidelines under the SEL
consist of complex formal rules.  For instance, under the current SEL
the legal form of the fund determines whether units of a non-
securities investment fund are treated as securities.125  If the fund is
119. For a theoretical explanation of these regulatory characteristics, see Hideki Kanda,
Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured In-
vestment Funds in Japan, 12 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 569 (1991).
120. See id. at 583.
121. See Japan’s Big Bang, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A18.
122. See Kanda, supra note 119, at 583.
123. See id.
124. See Japan’s Big Bang, supra note 121.
125. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
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organized as a corporation, the units are securities, but if the fund is
organized in trust form, the units are not securities.126
B.  Political Elements
1.  Political Power of the Banking Industry.  The banking
industry in Japan formerly had substantial political influence and
enjoyed a generally favorable reputation.  In the past, the banking
industry successfully discouraged industrial firms from going directly
to the capital markets for cheaper funds.127  Long-term credit banks
issued bank debentures to the general public and transferred the
proceeds to their customer firms in the form of lending.128  Trust
banks sold special products called “loan trusts” and provided the
proceeds to their customer firms as traditional loans.129  Thus, the
banking industry prevented the liberalization of bond markets by
imposing various customary requirements on business firms that
wanted to issue bonds.130  Whenever new financial products were
invented or imported from outside Japan, the banking industry
successfully persuaded the MOF to place these new products outside
the SEL’s definition of a security, and prevented the securities firms
from monopolizing the intermediary business for such products.131
The recent decline of the banking industry’s power and
competitiveness, however, suggests that this industry may not control
future regulatory reform of the Japanese securitization market.
2.  Interaction Among Ministries.  Disputes among ministries in
legislative and administrative rulemaking processes also shape the
regulatory landscape in Japan.  A strong competitor of the MOF is
the MITI.  For example, in 1990 the MITI attempted to introduce a
market for commodity futures funds with support from trading
companies and leasing companies.  The original draft prepared by the
MITI faced strong opposition from the MOF, and the resulting
legislation was a compromise between both ministries.132  In 1992, the
MITI strongly opposed the MOF’s proposed extension of the SEL’s
126. See id.
127. For example, tekisai-kijun (bond eligibility standards) establishes standards for permit-
ting certain large companies to issue bonds.
128. See Long-Term Credit Banking Law, Law No. 187 of 1952.
129. See Loan Trust Act, Law No. 195 of 1952.
130. See supra note 127.
131. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1).
132. See Law for Regulating Business of Commodity Investments, Law No. 66 of 1992.
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definition of security.  The resulting definition133 is narrower than
originally contemplated by the MOF.  Also in 1992, the MITI
attempted to introduce legislation to enable leasing companies and
finance companies to securitize their asset portfolios under the
MITI’s control.  The MOF strongly opposed this proposed
legislation.  Again, the resulting legislation was a compromise
permitting joint jurisdiction in the administration of the law.134  In
short, disputes among relevant ministries and their business
constituencies is an important factor in the legislative process.
C.  Market Characteristics
1.  Market and Industry Fragmentation.  Market fragmentation
exists throughout the financial sector.  Traditionally, the money
generated in the Japanese capital markets was available only to
major industrial companies, such as Toyota, for long-term investment
purposes.135  Short-term corporate financing needs always were met
through bank loans.136  Medium and small companies had no access to
the Japanese capital markets.137  On average, such companies were
required to obtain funds at a relatively high cost.  Individuals such as
residential mortgage borrowers also had little access to Japanese
capital markets.138  As a result, excess funds generated in the Japanese
capital markets during the recent economic expansion had no outlet
in Japan other than large industrial firms.  Thus, much of these funds
flooded out of Japan into overseas markets.139
This traditional characteristic of fragmentation in the Japanese
financial markets is linked to bureaucratic control.  Due to the divi-
sion of power amongst the various ministries, certain aspects of fi-
nancial regulation are divided and managed independently from one
another.  For example, as a result of the Ministry of Construction’s
133. See SEL, supra note 8, art. 2(1)(2).
134. See MITI Law, supra note 3.
135. See supra note 127.
136. Commercial paper was not recognized until 1987.
137. See supra note 127.
138. In Japan, the residential mortgage has never been securitized.  One explanation is that
there is a separate scheme for subsidizing homeowners, administered by the Ministry of Con-
struction.  A public corporation, the Home Finance Corporation, extends mortgage lending
with low interest to homeowners.  The Corporation does not receive funds from the capital
market, but rather from the government budget.
139. See STUDY GROUP II, on Fundamental Matters, Securities and Exchange Council, in
REPORTS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COUNCIL 130 (1992).
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support, residential mortgages have received a special subsidy
through favorable tax treatment.140  Similarly, the road construction
industry has sometimes received favorable financing terms with the
backing of the Ministry of Construction.141
Under these circumstances, an insider/outsider distinction has
emerged.  Hence, if a firm in a particular industry securitized its fi-
nancial assets, it would generally have the entire securitization proc-
ess, including enhancement and selling the securitized products to in-
vestors, controlled within the industry and thus the ministry to which
it belongs.  Such a firm is likely to resist involvement by industry out-
siders. This means, for example, that a leasing company would deem
it undesirable to securitize its assets under the SEL because doing so
would result in the possible involvement of securities firms and the
MOF.
2.  Non-existence of Asset Finance.  Another notable
characteristic of the Japanese financial and capital markets is the
absence of asset-based lending.  Lenders disburse funds on the basis
of the creditworthiness of a borrower, not the borrower’s assets.  This
lack of asset-based lending prevented the emergence and
development of asset securitization in Japan.
D.  Recent Trends
Securitization is a worldwide trend unlikely to be reversed in the
short term, yet it is difficult to predict its future in Japan.  Until quite
recently, the legal and nonlegal environment seemed to discourage
the rapid development of a domestic securitization market.  Regula-
tory conditions reflect the complex political and historical landscape
of Japan.  The degree of the banking industry’s political power sug-
gests that increased securitization in Japan in the future would ac-
company increased involvement of banks in intermediary services.
Recent unfavorable economic conditions and the decline of financial
institutions’ power and competitiveness, however, have crystallized in
a call for a drastic change of the regulatory environment for securiti-
zation.142  Coupled with the Big Bang program, the Japanese securiti-
zation market may well flourish in the near future.
Although domestic forces are likely to be the most important
140. See Special Tax Measures Law, Law No. 26 of 1957, art. 41.
141. The government has spent substantial funds on road repair and construction.  See
LECTURE ON PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPAN 185 (Yoshio Tamura ed., 1997).
142. See The Financial System Research Council, supra note 16.
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source of change, globalization of financial markets may also be rele-
vant.  As capital markets become increasingly internationalized, the
traditional regulatory environment in Japan may have to change.  A
country with a unique regulatory environment might be placed in an
unfavorable position if such regulatory differences prevent worldwide
capital market activities in that country.  The increased need for
regulatory cooperation in the international financial services field
may influence Japan to progress toward a more universal standard in
administering and enforcing their policies.143
V.  CONCLUSION
The legal and nonlegal environments for securitization in Japan,
like those in other countries, are complex and difficult to understand
in isolation.  The worldwide trend toward deregulation and increased
competition among financial intermediaries has had significant im-
pact on Japanese developments in recent years, both in regulation
and practice.  However, the domestic concern seems to be the major
impetus for reform of financial regulation in Japan.  The Japanese se-
curitization market may flourish as a result of the drastic reform pro-
gram.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict when and how rapidly the
Japanese regulatory environment will evolve to the point where
Japanese elements of regulation and practice become indistinguish-
able from other international forms.
Perhaps it is fair to say that every capital market regulatory re-
form in Japan continues to be led by bureaucrats.  However it is the
marketplace, rather than the government, that produces demand for
continuous change in the regulatory environment as new financial
products emerge.  Thus, recent developments viewed as a whole may
be understood as an indication of a long-term trend that will result in
Japanese capital markets ultimately becoming demand-driven rather
than government-driven.  If recent developments are viewed as cen-
tering on the market, the key issue will be the fundamental change of
the government’s role in Japanese capital markets.  Capital markets
function in an efficient way only when new instruments or securities
are created, handled and sold under market-based mechanisms.
They do not fit in a system of segmented government regulation.
Viewed this way, a fundamental change in the regulatory environ-
143. The universal standard currently being developed consists of (1) capital adequacy of
financial intermediaries; (2) increased disclosure of information; and (3) increased cooperation
among regulators.  See Kanda, supra note 15, at 14-15.
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ment must occur if Japanese capital markets are to regain interna-
tional competitiveness.  Securitization may eventually serve as an im-
petus for such fundamental change.
